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EXPLORING VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION 
OF INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 
Alfred W. Blumrosen* 
Changes in law, technology, and philosophy have, as a practical mat-
ter, undermined the rule that employment decisions can be made for 
a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all. 1 The age of the 
employer's unreviewable power over its employees is over. 2 Today, 
• Professor of Law, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey. A.B. (1950), J.D. (1953), 
University of Michigan, Chief of Conciliations, United States Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, 1965-67; Consultant to EEOC Chair Eleanor Holmes Norton, 1977-79, in connec-
tion with EEOC reorganization, Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures and Affirmative 
Action. Special Attorney, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 1968; Consultant 
to the Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contract Compliance, 1969-71; Advisor to private 
parties in connection with Equal Employment matters, 1973-77; and since March, 1979, Member, 
Labor Arbitration Panels of the American Arbitration Association, Federal Mediation and Con-
ciliation Service. 
I. See Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) ("For good cause, for 
bad cause, even for cause morally wrong."). 
2. See generally COMMITTEE ON LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, At-Will Employment and th(f! 
Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 170 (1981) [hereinafter cited as At-Will 
Employment]; Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 
40 OHIO ST. L.J. I (1979); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: 
The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980). 
In addition to the shift in the attitude expressed in common law decisions, see Note, (Reform-
ing At-Will Employment Law: A Model Statute) 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 389 (1983) [hereinafter 
cited as Note, Model Statute), I have argued that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) ("Title VII"), imposes a de facto re-
quirement that an employer have and present a "just" reason for termination of all employees. 
See Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers are Entitled to "Just Cause" Protection Under 
Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL L.J. 519 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen, "Just Cause" Protec-
tion]; Blumrosen, Individual Worker-Employer Arbitration Under Title VII, 31 PROC. N.Y.U. 
NAT'L CONF. ON LAB. 329 (1978). The argument is based on the practical necessity for an employer 
to justify its actions once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case under Title VII, and the 
presumption that employers do not act for irrational reasons. See Texas Dep't of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56 (1981); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 
576-78 (1978). This development has been pushed to an extreme in Connecticut v. Teal, 102 
S. Ct. 2525 (1982), which requires that all hiring decisions and, by inference, termination deci-
sions, be based on job-related reasons, regardless of whether there is any overall adverse impact 
on minorities or women as a group. Although I vigorously disagree with the reasoning in Teal 
as a matter of Title VII law, see Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment Discrimina-
tion and Legislative Intent: The Fallacy a/Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 99 (1983), 
it certainly provides further support for the view that Title VII functionally precludes arbitrary 
employer action. Workers may also challenge employer arbitrariness under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) ("ADEA''). See, e.g., 
Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129-30 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. 
Ct. 1439 (1982) (describing elements of a prima facie case); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 601 F.2d 
1003 (1st Cir. 1979) (discussing burden of proof in ADEA case). 
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employment decisions are subject to a patchwork review under anti-
discrimination laws, 3 and the rapidly growing body of common law 
restrictions. 4 There are also calls for the adoption of state statutes. 5 
The question now is what processes and principles should be applied 
in reviewing those employment decisions which are no longer sheltered 
from judicial scrutiny. 
I believe that at this stage in the evolution of employment law we 
should encourage the use of arbitration as a primary means of resolv-
ing disputes concerning dismissals of higher-level, white-collar 
employees. This can be accomplished by including arbitration clauses 
in individual employment contracts within the framework of existing 
laws. 
This Article outlines an arbitration process which may be employed 
in individual employment contracts to achieve a fair disposition of 
disputes, with the maximum finality for an arbitration decision which 
is consistent with legal principles. Where finality is not possible, ar-
bitration would be a condition precedent to formal legal processes. 
To assure fairness in the process, the employer would agree to pay 
the arbitrator's fee and the employee's attorney fees incurred in con-
nection with the arbitration. 
To facilitate discussion of the issues involved in this approach, a 
sample individual employment contract arbitration provision is discussed 
throughout this Article. This provision appears in full in the Appen-
dix. Although' I do not expect universal acceptance of the solutions 
offered, I believe that each of the subjects discussed should be ad-
dressed in any generalized approach to individual employment con-
tract arbitration. If this proposal generates serious interest, it would 
be useful to hold a national conf ernce to consider the details of a 
"model" individual employment contract arbitration clause. 
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. The Focus on "Higher Level" Discharge Cases 
The changing political, social, and technological values of the last 
3. In addition to Title VII and ADEA, employees have protection from certain employer 
decisions under numerous federal and state statutes. For a listing of various statutes, see Note, 
Model Statute, supra note 2, at 393 n.23. 
4. See At-Will Employment, supra note 2, at 180-89. 
5. See, e.g., Mennemeier, Protection from Unjust Discharges: An Arbitration Scheme, 19 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49 (1982); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time 
for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Note, Model Statute, supra note 2. In addition to 
this scholarly support for state statutes, at least five states are considering statutory proposals 
to provide "just cause" protection. See id. at 404 n.82; see also Steiber, Protection Against 
Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. M1cH. J.L. REF. 319 (1983) (proposing 
a federal statute for just cause protection). 
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half century have increased the legal responsibility of employers for 
their employees. Political processes have subjected employment deci-
sions to legal restraint first, in the 1930's, with respect to employer 
anti-unionism and later, in the 1960's, with respect to race, sex, na-
tional origin, and age discrimination. 6 These changes contributed to 
a shift in underlying social attitudes toward unfettered employer freedom 
of action - a shift which culminated in the growing body of common 
law decisions that require increased fairness in employer-employee 
relations. 1 One does not have to analogize the employment relation 
to "property rights" to recognize the importance of the relationship 
and the social need to afford it some legal recognition. 8 The nature 
of work has been changing since the turn of the century. The propor-
tion of employees who work in white-collar jobs which involve profes-
sional, technical, and managerial activities has drastically increased. 
One analyst has suggested that within twenty years our blue-collar work 
force will be little larger than our current agricultural work force. 9 In 
this growing area of white-collar employment, unionism - the tradi-
tional bulwark of worker protection - has had limited attraction. 10 
Workers who have felt the need for protection from arbitrary managerial 
decisions have banded together, if at all, under the ad hoc umbrella 
of discrimination class actions, 11 rather than participate in the collec-
tive bargaining process. 12 
Within this growing sector of the labor force, discharge is the primary 
managerial decision that triggers resort to the formal legal processes. 
Except in the pregnancy benefit 13 and pension areas,1 4 other manage-
ment decisions, such as assignment, payment, and fringe benefits, are 
rarely litigated. Discharge decisions, however, frequently lead to 
6. See Blumrosen, "Just Cause" Protection, supra note 2, at 521-22. 
7. See At-Will Employment, supra note 2, at 180-89 and cases cited therein. 
8. See Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exer-
cise of Employer Power, 67 CowM. L. REV. 1404, 1405, 1413-14 (1967); Note, Challenging the 
Employment-At-Will Doctrine Through Modern Contact Theory, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 449 
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Modern Contract Theory]; Note, Implied Contract Rights to 
Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 337-40 (1974). 
9. Peter Drucker has predicted a decline in the blue-collar labor force to around IOOJo in 
2005. BNA DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), A-7, March 26, 1981. 
IO. In 1960, 8.6% of the 28.5 million white-collar workers were unionized. In 1978, 8.2% 
of the 49 million white-collar workers were unionized. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1979 & 1981). See also Angel, Professionals and Unionization, 
66 MINN. L. REv. 383, 386-87 (1982) (discussing low rate of unionization among white-collar 
workers). 
11. See, e.g., Bean v. Crocker Nat'I Bank, 600 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1979); Price v. Maryland 
Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977). 
12. See Feliu, Discharge of Professional Employees: Protecting Against Dismissal for Acts 
Within a Professional Code of Ethics, 11 CoLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv., 149, 175 (1979-1980); 
Angel, supra note 10, at 386-87. 
13. See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). 
14. See, e.g., Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
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litigation. 15 This is especially true for workers over forty, covered by 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 16 who may 
feel that the employer has not adequately recognized their long-term 
contribution to the institution. 17 
It is therefore appropriate to focus the discussion of development 
of individual employment contract arbitration around the issue of 
discharge of a higher-level managerial, professional, or technical 
employee from a white-collar job. 18 
B. Advantages of Arbitration Over the Existing Legal Process 
Today, employment decisions are subject to review in a wide range 
of federal and state courts and administrative agencies. 19 Recent changes 
in employment law under common law and statutorily based decisions 
suggest that these tribunals will face increased caseloads in the future. 
In addition, the general rise in litigiousness documented by the Chief 
Justice in his recent plea for arbitration20 suggests that this develop-
ment will continue. This increase in litigation poses new and serious 
problems for employers and employees, including increased costs, delay, 
complexity, and uncertainty. I believe that contractual arbitration will 
avoid or minimize many of these problems and provide useful benefits 
for both employers and employees. 
1. Decreasing delay- The ordinary processes of law, both in ad-
ministrative agencies and courts, are slow. 21 In addition to the strain 
on court calendars, delay causes hardship for both employers and 
employees. Employers face the risk of back pay awards which may 
increase during the time it takes to process cases. At the same time, 
15. See, e.g., Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (employee allegedly 
discharged to avoid vesting of pension benefits). 
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
17. See, e.g., Smith v. World Book-Childcraft Int'!, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ill. 1980) 
(employee terminated after 21 years of service); Schulz v. Hickock Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 
(N.D. Ga. 1973). 
18. Both Professor Summers and Mr. Mennemeier would exclude higher-level employees from 
their proposed statutes for a variety of reasons. See Mennemeier, supra note 5, at 79-81; Sum-
mers, supra note 5, at 524-26. But these are precisely the employees whose propensity to litigate 
creates the greatest risk to the employer. 
19. These include state civil rights agencies which have hearing powers, see, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. 
LAW§ 295(7) (McKinney 1982), the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which 
does not, 42 U .S.C. §§ 2000e-4(g) to e-5 (1976), federal district courts which hear cases arising 
under anti-discrimination statutes, and state court proceedings on "new" tort and contract claims. 
20. Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982). 
21. Id. See also Lewin, New Alternatives to Litigation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1982, at DI, 
col. 3, D2, col. I ("The average arbitration takes 141 days from filing to award, in contrast 
with the nationwide average of 20 months for a civil suit to get from filing to trial in the Federal 
courts."); Olson, Controlling Litigation Costs: Some Proposals for Reform, 2 LITIGATION, Summ. 
1981, at 16. 
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tte uncertainty and anguish of prolonged litigation has ruined the per-
sonal and professional lives of many employees. For every worker who 
has become a hero in litigation, there are many whose lives have been 
stultified by it. 22 Because arbitration is less time-consuming than litiga-
tion, it reduces this risk for employees. 
2. Decreasing costs- The costs of litigation are great. Attorney 
fees have dramatically increased during the past several years 23 prevent-
ing many discharged employees from seeking relief because they need 
counsel at the moment when their income has been cut off. Even if 
an employee can afford an attorney, though, the prospect of a limited 
recovery may not justify the expense of a lawsuit. 
From an employer's perspective, the costs associated with employ-
ment discrimination suits, including damages and the employee's at-
torney fees, may also be great. 24 For example, in Cance/lier v. Federated 
Department Stores, the court upheld a $2.3 million jury verdict which 
consisted of attorney fees, compensation, and punitive damages. 25 Such 
verdicts may be even more burdensome if employees bring class ac-
tions, and potential liability is expanded beyond individual employees. 
Arbitration of the type suggested below solves these difficulties. Litiga-
tion expenses for employees would be reduced because employers would 
pay for the arbitrator and the employee's attorney fees. 26 At the same 
time, the employer will avoid unduly large individual verdicts because 
the arbitration agreement limits liability to lost wages and fringe benefits, 
and reduces the risk of class action litigation. 
3. Decreased complexity and uncertainty- The rapidly changing 
nature of employment law makes it difficult for employees and 
employers to determine what type of activity is improper. Furthermore, 
the calls for new legislation raise problems of increased regulation in 
the workplace. The possibility of another regulatory agency21 only ac-
centuates this complexity. Arbitration can develop and apply substan-
tive principles concerning wrongful discharge in higher-level jobs, thereby 
reducing the need for statutory protection. Arbitration thus may fur-
ther the objective of fair treatment for employees, without establishing 
a more elaborate legal process. 
22. See, e.g., Hochstadt v. Worchester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d "222 (1st 
Cir. 1976) (illustrating how concern over alleged discrimination caused deterioration in personal 
relationships); see also Burger, supra note 20, at 275. 
23. See Rosenberg; Rient & Rowe, Expenses: The Roadblock to Justice, 20 JUDGES' J ., Summ. 
1981, at 16, 17. 
24. Under federal civil rights acts, a losing employ~r must pay the employee's attorney fees 
as well as its own. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney Fee Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
(Supp. II 1978); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Title VII provision); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (ADEA provision). 
25. 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982). The court awarded $1.9 million to three employees in 
addition to $400,000 in attorney fees. Id. at 1315. 
26. See infra sec. III G-H. 
27. See Coulson, Arbitration/or the Individual Employee, 5 EMPL. REL. L.J. 406, 407 (1979-80). 
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4. Increased neutrality- Employment litigation may be perceived 
by both employers and employees as involving biased decision-makers. 
A jury largely composed of retired or older persons may be viewed 
as unfair by an employer defendant in an age discrimination case. A 
jury largely composed of whites may seem unfair to a black seeking 
relief under the old Civil Rights Act. 28 I suspect that juries are more 
likely to find for employee plaintiffs in cases of egregious employer 
conduct: thus, employees may lose before juries where the claim is 
meritorious but does not involve extreme employer misconduct. Ar-
bitration minimizes these difficulties because the arbitrator is chosen 
by the parties who may exclude those likely to be overly biased against 
them. 
5. Other advantages- In addition to the advantages discussed 
above, employers may find other important benefits from arbitration. 
The availability of arbitration may reduce the perceived need for 
unionization among higher-level employees. This is particularly true 
when an employer uses arbitration as a final step in an internal grievance 
procedure. 29 From the perspective of a discharged employee, these in-
ternal procedures may work more satisfactorily if they are administered 
with a realistic expectation of a genuine outside review by an arbitrator. 
In addition the comparative confidentiality of arbitration, 30 reduces 
the risk that the employer will acquire a reputation for unfair treat-
ment of employees. Some employees may be less hesitant to assert claims 
in the informal process than through the public forums of litigation. 
II. S:_IANDARDS OF FAIRNESS IN THE ARBITRATION PROCESS 
In collective bargaining relationships, the details of the arbitration 
process are hammered out between the union and the employer against 
a background of half a century's experience. 31 In non-unionized private 
sector employment, there is no organization analogous to the union 
to represent employee interests in developing arbitration procedures. 32 
Therefore, the employer and its lawyers have a comparatively free hand 
in drafting the details of an arbitration clause. Because job applicants 
are likely to want a job more than discussions about a forum in which 
to assert rights if they are fired, the employer frequently will be able 
28. 42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1976). 
29. See generally Brown, Limiting Your Risks in the New Russian Roulette - Discharging 
Employees, 8 EMPL. REL. L.J. 380, 399-401 (I 982-83) (discussing benefits and use of arbitration 
as final step in grievance procedure for unorganized employees); Coulson, supra note 27, at 
407, 409-10 (discussing degree to which non-union employers use grievance mechanisms, including 
arbitration). 
30. See Lewin, supra note 21. 
31. See Feller, The Impact of External law Upon labor Arbitration, in THE FUTURE OF 
LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 83, 84-87 (1976). 
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to obtain an arbitration clause of its own design. Under these cir-
cumstances, some employers may seek to unfairly narrow the legal rights 
of employees in the arbitration clause. 
This temptation should be tempered by two legal principles which 
limit the employer's contractual power to restrict the employee's rights. 
The first is a general requirement of fairness which will modify any 
arrangement that the courts believe is overreaching or ''unconscion-
able. " 33 Thus, an implied covenant of good faith may be read into 
the contract. 34 This principle is likely to be applied where an arbitra-
tion clause is drafted by the employer and presented to the prospective 
employee on a "take it or leave it" basis. The clause may be con-
sidered a contract of adhesion to be construed against the employer. 35 
The second principle is more specific. Employees generally may not 
contract away statutory rights intended for their protection lest these 
rights prove illustory. 36 The employer's superior position, which gave 
rise to statutory protection for employees, 37 cannot be exercised by 
contract to extinguish these rights. If the rule were otherwise, legisla-
tion designed to benefit the weaker party could be easily nullified. There 
is some leeway in waiving statutory rights, however, where the courts 
are convinced that the transaction is fair. 38 
These principles require that any arbitration process developed by 
the employer manifest sufficient fairness toward the employee to justify 
serious modification of employee rights before a court will give final-
ity or even deference to it. 39 This standard of fairness may not provide 
equivalent protection for employee interests which might emerge through 
unionization, but in the absence of worker organizations, it is the only 
32. Although in recent years there has been a growth of interest in the rights of non-union 
employees, it has not crystallized into an organizational form. See Feliu, supra note 12, at 175-76. 
33. See Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employ-
ment At Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 486 (1980). 
34. Cf Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
California law recognizes implied covenant of good faith in employment contracts); Magnan 
v. Anaconda Indus., 37 Conn. Supp. 38, 429 A.2d 492 (1980) (employer breaches covenant of 
good faith if it engages in fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). 
35. See, e.g., Stopford v. Boonton Molding Co., 56 N.J. 169, 184, 265 A.2d 657,665 (1970) 
("A contract should not be read to make the employer's plan a mere ephemeron and the promise 
to pay a pension upon peformance of the fixed terms a mere illusion."). 
36. Thus, employee rights under workers compensation, equal employment, minimum wage, 
and union activities laws are not subject to "final and binding" waivers. See, e.g., Barrantine 
v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (claims under Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 
U.S. 36, 47-48 (1974) (Title VII claims); see also infra sec. IV (discussing effect of. "final and 
binding" provision in arbitration agreement). 
37. See Note, Model Statute supra note 2, at 392. 
38. See Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1982) (employee volun-
tarily signed retirement agreement). 
39. For a more detailed discussion of the effect of arbitration on employee legal rights, see 
infra sec. IV. 
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standard available to evaluate employer-drafted arbitration clauses. 
III. PROVISIONS OF A "MODEL" AGREEMENT 
Sections I and II outlined the advantages of arbitration for higher-
level employees and their employers and the standard of fairness by 
which courts will measure such a process. Section III will examine the 
details of a "model" arbitration agreement. 40 
A. Subject Matter 
Any controversy or claim ansmg out of or relating to the 
termination of the employee by the employer, including any 
claim based in whole or in part on federal, state, or local laws, 
whether statutory or common law, shall be settled by arbitra-
tion in accordance with this agreement. 
Discharge cases are likely to be most troublesome to the employer. 
They pose the greatest risk of liability, especially in connection with 
high-level jobs. Employe_es have less to lose in discharge cases and are 
thus more likely to litigate the fairness of discharges than other claims. 
Therefore, in the opening stages of development of individual arbitra-
tion, it is appropriate to limit the arbitration clause to discharge cases. 
Another reason to focus on discharge cases is the need to develop 
standards of fairness in white-collar discharge cases. Professor Sum-
mers has argued that the principles of "just cause" developed by labor 
arbitrators can be applied to nonunion situations as well. 42 To the ex-
tent his assertion applies to high-level jobs, I do not believe just cause 
principles developed in "blue-collar" cases are readily transferable. Our 
concepts of "just cause" for termination have evolved out of experience 
with blue-collar workers under collective bargaining arbitration. 41 Most 
of these cases deal with jobs which can be precisely defined; the employer 
can document failure, identify concretely where the employee perfor-
mance is inadequate, and measure whether the employee has improved. 
In high-level jobs, it is difficult to define the work with precision. The 
employer's judgment of success or failure is often subjective. It may 
40. A model arbitration clause is set out in full in an appendix to this Article. Those provi-
sions that refer to time periods or dollar limitations do not include suggested limits. It is intended 
that the parties negotiate over the appropriate terms. 
41. See generally D. BEELER, DISCIPLINE & DISCHARGE 1-29 (1978) (discussing various ar-
bitration decisions involving "just cause" under collective bargaining agreements). 
42. Summers, Arbitration of Unjust Dismissal: A Preliminary Proposal, in THE FUTURE OF 
LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 159, 184-90 (1976). 
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be based on conditions - such as market forces - which are beyond 
the control of the employee. Thus, notions of employee fault developed 
in "blue-collar" cases may be inapposite. In many white-collar discharge 
situations, the employer may have expected better results than were 
obtained by the employee. One issue at arbitration will be whether that 
expectation was "fair." We have little experience with such issues. The 
commonly accepted principle of notifying the employee of inadequate 
performance, and of "equal treatment" of similarly situated employees 
may, therefore, be inappropriate when the requirements of the job can-
not be precisely defined. 43 
B. Standards to be Applied 
The Arbitrator shall determine whether the termination was 
lawful under federal, state, and local statutory and common 
law which is applicable to the dispute. In addition, the Arbitrator 
shall determine whether the termination was reasonable under 
the contract and under applicable company policie!?. 
Some employers may wish to confer authority upon the arbitrator 
to enforce only those standards that courts and agencies would other-
wise implement. Under this view, the arbitrator would assume the 
responsibilities of federal and state courts and agencies administering 
statutory and common law. This is different from the approach to ar-
bitration in collective agreements which limits the arbitrator to the "law 
of the shop," not the "law of the land. " 44 
Arbitration in collective agreements is a substitute for a strike over 
the administration of the agreement. 45 The arbitration clause under 
consideration here, however, is a substitute for litigation. Parties are 
free to submit legal disputes to arbitration. 46 They may direct the ar-
43. See, e.g., Valentino v. U.S. Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (discussing 
difficulty of applying statistical analyses to high-level positions); see also Bartholet, Application 
of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REv. 947, 959-64 (1982) (discussing different 
treatment of upper-level jobs under Title VII); Mennemeier, supra note 5, at 78-79 (1982) (discussing 
definition problems in higher-level jobs). 
44. Most collective contracts limit the arbitrator to the "interpretation and application" of 
the contract. This language is the basis for the Supreme Court decisions requiring that an award 
"draw its essence" from the contract. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car 
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 
363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 
363 U.S. 574, 580-82 (1960). 
45. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960); United 
Steelworkers ·or Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 
46. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 321-64 (1973). The 
failure to recognize this principle led the court to an erroneous result in W.R. Grace & Co. 
v. Local Union No. 759, 652 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 3481 (1982), 
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bitrator to apply only public law to their dispute by a provision stating: 
The Arbitrator shall apply all law, federal, state, and local 
statutory and common law which is applicable to the dispute. 
Under this view, an employer in a state such as Alabama would only 
be subject to review under federal statutory standards because state 
law does not restrict the employer's power to fire at will. 47 In Michigan, 
New Jersey, and many other states, the same contract language would 
require the arbitrator to apply the state's statutory and common law 
as well. 48 
Although some employers may pref er language which substitutes ar-
bitration for existing tribunals, most employees would believe that this 
language leaves them without sufficient protection. The law of employ-
ment is in transition. There may be situations where the old rules, or 
no rules, apply. The employee's interest would be better served by per-
mitting the arbitrator to go beyond existing law and exercise his or 
her sense of justice and fairness. A clause designed with this goal might 
read: 
The Arbitrator shall determine whether the termination was just 
and reasonable under all the circumstances. 
The employer would consider the phrase "just and reasonable" to 
be too open-ended. Without any limiting language, an arbitrator might 
decide that a given action was "reasonable" or "unreasonable" and 
never inquire into its legality. Such decisions would provide little pro-
tection from subsequent litigation. Nonetheless, employers may find 
an advantage in language which is broader than the "application of 
the law" standard, yet more restrictive than the "just and reasonable" 
clause. The advantage lies in the enhanced appearance of fairness if 
the parties adopt standards which go beyond formal legal requirements. 
where the arbitrator applied a legal interpretation pursuant to a clause which provided that: 
In the event that any provision of this agreement is found to be in conflict with any 
State or Federal law now existing or hereinafter enacted, it is agreed that such laws 
shall supersede the conflicting provisions without affecting the remainder of these 
provisions. 
672 F .2d at 125 5. The court set aside the arbitrator's decision without discussion of the arbitrator's 
authority to interpret the law. The court considered the arbitrator limited to interpreting the 
contract. Id. at 1257-58. The court, however, was concerned only with the arbitrator's authority 
as defined in typical collective bargaining agreements, and did not purport to lay down any 
abstract principle on the question of whether the parties had the power to submit a legal issue 
to arbitration. Id. at 1252-54. In my view the clause did just that. 
47. See, e.g., Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980). 
48. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 
880 (1980); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 17 A.2d 505 (1980). 
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This enhanced fairness reduces the risk that the arbitration clause will 
be viewed by courts merely as a facade to force an impermissible waiver 
of the employees' legal rights. The arbitration clause set out at the 
beginning of this section achieves such a balance by requiring the ar-
bitrator to apply legal principles, and the standards developed in the 
rest of the contract and established by the policies of the employer. 
The arbitration clause must be in writing to be enforceable under the 
United States Arbitration Act49 and similar state law. 50 
C. Management Flexibility 
The employer reserves the right to assign and reassign the 
employee to a job; to define the work to be performed, the 
manner in which it shall be performed, the equipment and sup-
port personnel which shall be provided, the supervision to be 
provided; and to evaluate employee performance under such 
standards as the employer chooses. 
No definite term of employment is offered. The employer 
reserves the right to discharge any employee after a determina-
tion that: 
i) the employee failed to meet employment performance 
standards; or 
ii) business needs will be furthered by said termination. 
The Arbitrator may decide· if the employer did make the stated 
determination and if it was reasonable in so doing. 
The existence or application of this agreement to arbitrate 
shall not alter or expand the rights of either party under this 
agreement. 
Many large employers have personnel manuals which states procedures 
and practices which, for practical purposes, are incorporated into in-
dividual employment contracts. 51 These handbooks attempt two seem-
ingly inconsistent objectives. They retain flexibility for management 
in decisions with respect to job assignments, promotions, transfers, 
and terminations; however, they also assure the employees of fair treat-
ment in connection with such decisions. 
The employee is apt to interpret the promise of "fair" treatment 
49. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976). See, e.g., American Home Assurance Co. v. Vecco Concrete 
Const. Co., 629 F.2d 961, 963 (4th Cir. 1980), citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 
198 (1956). 
50. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. PROC. CooE § 1281 (West 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.5001 
(1968); N.Y. Crv. PROC. LAw § 7501 (McKinney 1963). 
51. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 
!!80 (1980); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. App. 1977). 
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as a promise of "favorable" treatment. Many workers believe that job 
security tends to accumulate over time regardless of the details of the 
contractual relationship. 52 Therefore, if the employer does not intend 
to provide such protection, it should precisely state the flexibility that 
it wishes to preserve.' The clarification of the employer's interest in 
flexibility will disabuse employees of any notion that they have or are 
accruing job security which has not been offered. This clarity may drive 
some employees away, yet these employees would have otherwise come 
to work with false expectations. 53 The proposed management flexibil-
ity clause provides such precision and allows the arbitrator to deter-
mine whether the employer acted properly in exercising its rights. 
D. Written Decisions 
The Arbitrator shall submit with the award a written opin-
ion which shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
The arbitrator should be required to write an opinion explaining the 
reasoning behind his decision as is commonly done in labor arbitra-
tion under collective bargaining agreements. These decisions should be 
published. Although there are some advantages to a quick decision 
at the close of a hearing, three considerations make written opinions 
desirable. 
First is the vital need to develop acceptable standards of fairness. 
Labor arbitration decisions concerning "just cause" in "blue-collar" 
jobs that have commanded assent are helpful guides in administering 
labor relations systems. 54 A serious effort in this direction should now 
be made for "high-level" jobs. This will not be easy. A recent study 
of racial discrimination cases dealing with such jobs concludes that 
existing standards for evaluation of performance are inadequate. 55 
Publication of arbitration decisions in this area will facilitate the pro-
cess of making fair decisions in the first instance. 
Secondly, the opinion may be persuasive to the losing party, thus 
making the decision more binding in fact. A written opinion may reduce 
resentments which could otherwise trigger further reactions by the in-
dividuals involved. It may also reduce the prospect that the losing 
employee will seek judicial review or that the losing employer will resist 
the award. 
The third reason why written opinions are important is that they 
52. See, e.g., Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981); Gonsalves 
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 634 F.2d 1065 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1980). 
53. See Brown, supra note 29, at 390-92. 
54. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 46, at 365-88. 
55. Bartholet, supra note 43, at 1008-27. 
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provide the maximum legal finality for a decision. An arbitration deci-
sion without a reasoned opinion will produce finality in only the most 
limited class of claims. A well-reasoned opinion may carry a greater 
degree of finality in fact and in law. 56 
E. Selection of Arbitrator 
The employer will contact the former employee's attorney 
to identify the arbitrator, or, failing that, to institute the pro-
cedure for identification of the arbitrator. If no attorney is 
named, the employer will directly contact the former employee. 
If the parties cannot agree on an Arbitrator, they shall select 
an arbitrator from the lists from the American Arbitration 
Association, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 
or the appropriate state Mediation or Arbitration Service. 
If the employer chooses the arbitrator, a question of the arbitrator's 
impartiality may be raised. Even if the employee has an opportunity 
to participate in the selection of the arbitrator, a question of fairness 
exists. The employee may not have knowledge of the backgrounds and 
views of various persons who may be recommended to serve as an 
arbitrator. 57 Therefore, the employee will be at a disadvantage in the 
selection process. This could undermine the finality of an award. This 
issue is avoided if the employee retains counsel prior to the selection 
of the arbitrator. The courts are more likely to give the arbitration 
decision deference if the employee has an opportunity to be represented 
by counsel at all stages of the process, including selection of the 
arbitrator. 58 
It may seem strange to suggest that the employer advise its employees 
to retain counsel, yet in today's litigious world, the higher-level employee 
is apt to seek an attorney in any event. Thus, the employer loses little 
in including references to employee's counsel in the arbitration clause. 
The clause should provide that after the employee has given notice 
of a desire to arbitrate, a period of time will be provided during which 
the employee may retain counsel. Thereafter, the arbitrator should be 
selected. 
56. For a discussion on finality under the proposed arbitration clause, see infra sex. IV. 
57. One study concluded that the most important factor in arbitrator acceptability is name 
recognition. Lawson, Arbitrator Acceptability: Factors Affecting Selection, 36 ARB. J ., Dec. 
1981, at 22, 29. 
58. Cf. Mosley v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 634 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing im-
portance of counsel in Title VII conciliation stages). Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't 
Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1085 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that plaintiffs could not rely on equitable 
tolling because they were represented by counsel). 
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Selection by agreement between the employee and the employer ob-
viously is the most desirable situation. Where no such agreement is 
possible, then the parties should ref er to the existing lists of arbitrators 
of the American Arbitration Association or other conciliation services. 
As a last resort, the parties may place the selection of the arbitrator 
in the hands of a judge. 59 
F. Qualifications of Arbitrator 
The Arbitrator shall be an attorney who is admitted to prac-
tice law in one of the states of the United States of America. 
The arbitrator should be a lawyer because federal and state law must 
be applied to the termination. Lawyers have no monopoly on fairness 
or reasonableness, but they do have greater expertise than non-lawyers 
in applying statutes, writing decisions, and acting as if they were judges. 
If the parties are willing to submit their dispute to arbitrators with 
different qualifications, they are, of course, free to do so. 
G. Arbitration Fees and Costs 
The arbitrator's fees and expenses shall be paid by the 
employer. 
In collective bargaining arbitration, the parties divide the cost of 
arbitration, in part, to avoid bias by the arbitrator towards the party 
paying the fee. In individual arbitration, however, it is appropriate 
that the employer pay the arbitrator. The employer is avoiding the risk 
of a jury trial and extensive financial liability. Under these circumstances, 
to tax the employee with the burden of paying for a private judge might 
seem overreaching. The risks of an arbitrator leaning toward the 
employer may be addressed in other ways, such as by requiring publica-
tion of written opinions and the emergence of a "plaintiff's bar." 
H. Attorney Fees 
A reasonable attorney fee and expenses will be paid by the 
employer to the attorney selected by the employee for perform-
ing legal services in the conduct of arbitration under this con-
tract. This fee shall be based on the regular hourly rates of 
59. Cf. U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) (permitting court lo appoint arbitrator 
'f parties fail to agree). 
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the attorney for equivalent work. The fee and expenses to be 
paid by the employer shall not exceed __ dollars in any event. 
A detailed bill for services and expenses shall be submitted to 
the employer by the attorney for the employee upon receipt 
of the Arbitrator's award. The Arbitrator shall retain jurisdic-
tion to resolve any dispute concerning attorney fees and 
expenses. 
263 
The employer should agree to pay the employee's reasonable at-
torneys' fees in connection with the arbitration regardless of the out-
come of the proceeding. This guarantees the employee the right to in-
voke the arbitration process when the employee has lost a major source 
of income. It is a quid pro quo for the limited liability and other benefits 
that the employer gains. 
This provision gives an advantage to employees which even the Civil 
Rights Acts do not afford. The anti-discrimination laws provide that 
the employee's attorney is paid by the employer only if the employee 
prevails. 60 Under these acts, the employee must find an attorney who 
is prepared to gamble on the case if the employee cannot afford to 
pay. By agreeing to pay reasonable attorney fees in connection with 
arbitration, the employer removes that risk and assures that the employee 
will be represented at all stages of the arbitration process, including 
the selection of the arbitrator. This, in turn, enhances the likelihood 
of procedural fairness in the arbitration process and finality in tqe result. 
The agreement may also impose some maximum dollar limits, require 
that the employee's counsel submit statements of regular hourly rates 
and hours expended, and provide that attorney fee disputes are to be 
determined by the arbitrator. 
Attorney and arbitrator fee guarantees raise the question of the 
amount of an employer's additional cost to arbitrate as opposed to 
litigation. A rough estimate of the additional fees suggests that it is 
worth the extra expense to arbitrate because litigation fees, if the 
employee prevails, are likely to be significantly higher. 
The cost of an arbitrator may be assumed to be $500 a day. 6 ' Using 
the formula of two study days for one hearing day, the arbitrator will 
charge up to $3,000 plus expenses for a two-day hearing. The cost 
of the employee's attorneys' fees will be less in arbitration than in a 
drawn-out proceeding in the federal courts under ADEA, Title VII, 
or 42 U.S.C. § 1981.62 Based on a fee of $100 per hour for five days 
60. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. II 
1978); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Title VII provision); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (ADEA provision). 
61. Five hundred dollars a day is a high estimate. See R. Reilly, Memorandum to New England 
Arbitrators, American Arbitration Association (May 5, 1981) (most fees ranging from $200-$300) 
(on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
62. Attorney fees will vary depending on prevailing area rates. See Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, 
264 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 16:2 
plus expenses, the attorneys' fees could amount to $5,000. Thus, the 
clear additional cost that can be identified is roughly $8,000 to have 
the case presented to an arbitrator. An average of $8,000 per case is 
a bargain for the employer who would otherwise be subject to ADEA 
(and it is likely that most of these upper-level job cases will involve 
persons over forty years of age) where the risk of liability is compounded 
by the right of a plaintiff to have a jury trial, an "opt in" class ac-
tion, and pendant state claims. 63 
There is a risk to employers associated with this proposal. Without 
arbitrator and attorney fee guarantees, some employees might not 
challenge what they consider an unfair dismissal. The arrangement sug-
gested here may encourage them to arbitrate where otherwise they would 
do nothing. This risk must be weighed by employers against the benefit 
of some employees arbitrating where they would otherwise litigate. 
Without the guarantee there is an increased risk that some employees 
will file a discrimination claim, to invoke the attorney fee provisions 
of the civil rights laws. 
Some employers may consider this risk to be of less consequence 
than the possible encouragement of arbitration which the attorney fee 
provision creates. These employers will probably omit the attorney fee 
provision, and let experience spell out the dimensions of the risk. These 
employers, however, should consider that there is presently an incen-
tive under the Civil Rights Acts to litigate either in a federal court 
or before a state civil rights agency64 - a process which could cost 
much more than the attorney fees in arbitration. 65 The suggested at-
torneys' fees provision will cancel that incentive. 
/. Discovery 
Prior to the hearing, the parties shall exchange a list of 
witnesses to be called. The employer will supply to the 
Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 768 (7th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. May 
19, 1982) (No. 81-2135). 
63. See, e.g., Chancellier v. Federated Dep't. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982) (award-
ing $2.3 million jury verdict, including $400,000 in attorney fees); Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus. 
Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (awarding $69,565.32, plus attorney fees of $18,556). 
64. See, e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) (holding attorney 
fees available under Title VII for work before State Civil Rights Agency); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, 
Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 767 (7th Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. May 
19, 1982) (No. 81-2135) (allowing attorney fees for time spent persuading federal government 
to enforce Executive Order 11,246 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965)). In Sullivan v. Bureau of Vocational 
Rehabilitation, 663 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981), the court held that, to qualify for attorney fees 
under Title VII, a plaintiff must meet two requirements. First, the plaintiff must succeed on 
the merits. Second, the proceeding in which the plaintiff was successful "must be causally linked 
to the prosecution of the Title VII complaint." 663 F.2d at 452. The court allowed attorney 
fees for the arbitration based on Sullivan's facts. Yet the court explicitly stated that attorney 
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employee's attorney a copy of the employee's personnel file, 
and a copy of the personnel files of no more than __ other 
employees whose records are relevant in the proceeding. All 
such files will be maintained in a confidential manner by the 
employee and attorney, shall be used only for preparation of 
the arbitration case, and shall be returned to the employer at 
the close of the hearing. 
265 
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company, 66 the Supreme Court in-
dicated that the lack of discovery in arbitration was one factor which 
made it an inadequate process for disposing of Title VII claims. 67 Alex-
ander suggests that we consider the timing, nature, and purpose of 
discovery in the arbitration process. 68 In a discharge case, the employer 
is interested in learning who the employee intends to call as a witness 
and how those persons will testify. The employee is interested in infor-
mation which may be of assistance including internal memoranda and 
personnel files of the employee and of other persons whom the employee 
believes were treated more favorably. It may be useful to include in 
the arbitration clause a list of materials which will be exchanged prior 
to the hearing. At the hearing, the arbitrator may require the produc-
tion of specific material. 
J. Relief 
If the Arbitrator finds that the employee was terminated in 
violation of the law or this agreement, he shall order reinstate-
ment and back pay for time lost, less sums earned elsewhere 
or paid in lieu of employment by the employer during the period 
after discharge and before arbitration. At the option of the 
employer, which may be exercised within ten days of the receipt 
of the award, the employee shall not be reinstated, but shall 
be paid backpay in lieu of reinstatement, in the amount of or 
measured by __ . 
The starting point for the analysis of relief is that which is com-
monly set forth in collective bargaining agreements and under statutory 
fees may not be awarded ''merely because, without more, the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining 
relief in a contemporaneous arbitration proceeding." Id. 
65. See, e.g., Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 762, 769 (7th Cir. 1982) (allowing 
attorney fees of $1,510,768), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3949 (U.S. May 19, 1982) 
(No. 81-2135). 
66. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
67. Id. at 57-58. 
68. See id. 
266 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 16:2 
standards. Under these standards, the arbitrator would be empowered 
to award reinstatement and back pay. 69 Because of the complexity in-
herent in "high-level jobs," however, it is useful to explore other forms 
of relief. 
Reinstatement requires a special examination in the case of high-
level jobs. This examination is compelled by the common sense recogni-
tion that close interpersonal relations are essential for the successful 
performance of some such jobs - particularly those involving exten-
sive interaction with other persons in managing, directing, advising, 
and coordinating. Not all jobs are sensitive, and not all terminated 
employees would, if reinstated, be prone to failure because of the sensi-
tivities in the situation. This risk is so significant, however, that reinstate-
ment should not be automatic with respect to these jobs. I believe it 
should be optional. 
The option could be exercised by the arbitrator. This would, however, 
add a major issue to the hearing process and would involve guesswork 
by the arbitrator. The option could not be left with the employee because 
the employee would almost always elect reinstatement. Therefore, the 
option is best left with the employer. This is appropriate if the agree-
ment provides for fair compensation to an employee who is not 
reinstated. This fair compensation might be measured in terms of 
number of years of back pay. The option provision should also allow 
the employer to propose alternatives to reinstatement in the same job 
- such as a 'transfer - after the award is in. 
Calculation of back pay should include fringe benefits along with 
wages. One very important fringe benefit for higher-level employees 
is the cost to the employee of duplicating the tangible facilities which 
the employer routinely supplied, such as: office space, secretarial help, 
computer time, and access to specialized literature. 
IV. EFFECT OF ARBITRATION ON EMPLOYEE'S LEGAL RIGHTS 
The agreement should provide that the arbitrator's decision is final 
and binding to the extent permitted by law. The phrase "final and 
binding" reflects the employer's desire for an end to the dispute. The 
qualifying phrase, "to the extent permitted by law," recognizes that 
an arbitrator's decision may not be binding with respect to certain claims 
under anti-discrimination statutes. 
The decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding be-
tween the parties as to all claims which were or could have 
been raised in connection with the termination, to the full ex-
69. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 46, at 648-51. 
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tent permitted by law. In all other cases, the parties agree that 
the decision of the Arbitrator shall be a condition precedent 
to the institution or maintenance of any legal, equitable, ad-
ministrative, or other formal proceeding by the employee in 
connection with the termination, and that the decision and opin-
ion of the Arbitrator may be presented in any other forum on 
the merits of the dispute. 
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1. Effect on state law claims- The final and binding clause will 
operate with respect to state breach of contract claims. 70 Whether the 
final and binding clause will operate with respect to state tort law claims 
is a more complex question. Tort claims which are related to the con-
tractual relationship such as defamation, conspiracy, and invasion of 
privacy will be subject to the clause. 11 
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress can be argued 
to be akin to assault, where the public interest may preclude private 
disposition. Yet, if the "tort" of infliction of emotional distress is 
beyond the scope of a "final and binding" arbitration clause, the value 
of such a clause is nullified because such a claim can be made in every 
termination case. Many workers invest both their professional and per-
sonal lives and reputations in their work. They depend on their jobs 
and their performances as employees for a good part of their self-
identity. 72 Therefore, virtually every involuntary termination will in-
flict emotional distress on the employee. To exclude this tort from the 
finality accorded to the arbitration agreement will, in effect, nullify 
the agreement. The question whether to subsume this tort under the 
arbitration clause should be decided on the grounds of contemporary 
policy, not on the basis of labels and analogies which derive from the 
forms of action. As a matter of policy, I would opt in all such cases 
to give full effect to arbitration. The arbitration clause suggested here 
should be construed to encompass all tort claims which are not based 
on the violation of elementary standards of physical decency. 73 
2. Effect on statutory claims- Alexander v. Garnder Denver 
70. See, e.g., Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1146-47 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 103 S. Ct. 84 (1983). 
71. See, e.g., Altshul Stern & Co. v. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., 385 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 
1967) (conspiracy); Travel Am. Corp. v. World Airways, 443 F. Supp. 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(slander). 
72. See Note, Modern Contract Theory, supra note 8, at 451. 
73. The types of tort claims which might not be covered by the clause include the following 
cases: Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977) (employee wrongfully 
accused of stealing and subjected to continuous humiliation because of racial slurs); Kissinger 
v. Mannor, 92 Mich. App. 572, 285 N.W.2d 214 (1979) (employee's request for replacement 
while he went to the bathroom denied; subsequent request to change clothing also denied; court 
allowed claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
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Co. 74 holds that there can be no valid and binding prospective waiver 
of rights under Title VII. The same rule is applicable to ADEA and 
other civil rights type claims. 75 The arbitration involved in Alexander 
was part of a collective agreement signed by the union. 76 The agree-
ment to arbitrate was never signed by the employee. That might 
distinguish Alexander from the individual contract under considera-
tion here. 
Even if Alexander is distinguishable, it is unlikely that courts would 
uphold an agreement in advance of any dispute not to assert statutory 
rights. These statutes were enacted to improve the economic position 
of members of disadvantaged groups vis-a-vis employers. The courts 
will not allow the superior bargaining power of the employer to 
obliterate these rights. Busy judges, however, are not adverse to hav-
ing their work done by others. Therefore, they may uphold a_ contract 
provision requiring arbitration as a condition precedent to the trial of 
employment discrimination claims. 11 Moreover, the courts may, con-
sistent with Alexander, accept a role as a reviewer of arbitration deci-
sions, rather than undertake a full de novo examination of the 
allegations. 78 The relationship between individual contract arbitration 
and the civil rights litigation involves three issues: an exhaustion of 
contract remedies problem; a problem of when the cause of action arises; 
and the appropriate policies to be considered in establishing the rela-
tion between the statute and arbitration. 
a. Exhaustion of Contract Remedies- As a matter of both policy 
and expediency, busy federal and state courts would pref er to see a 
trial held in another forum, rather than before the judge. 79 When the 
parties have agreed to arbitrate, it is both fair and expedient to require 
them to honor their agreement and exhaust their contractual remedy. 80 
This approach is necessarily tempered by the principle that advance 
contract waivers of statutory rights are prohibited or at least disfavored. 
Therefore, any judicially imposed requirement of exhaustion should 
be subject to two conditions. 
First, the contract remedy must in fact be available. 81 The employer 
74. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
75. See Hoellering, Finality in Arbitration: How Final?, 34 N.Y.U. CoNF. LAB. 119, 123 (1982). 
76. 415 U.S. at 39-42. 
77. The inherent delays in both administrative and judicial processing of the claims make 
it unlikely that a court trial date would be reached before an arbitration decision, even without 
such a clause. 
78. 415 U.S. at 60 n.21. 
79. See, e.g., Duo Metal & Iron Works v. S.T.C. Constr. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1023, 1024-25 
(E.D. Pa. 1979); McRae v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 2d 166, 172, 34 Cal. Rptr. 346, 350 
(1963). 
80. Cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965) (requiring employee to 
exhaust arbitration procedure in collective bargaining agreement). 
81. Cf. Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679 (1981) (not requiring exhaustion of internal union 
appeals procedure, if procedure cannot reactivate grievance or grant full relief sought). 
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asserting the exhaustion doctrine must indicate its willingness to waive 
time or other limitations in the contract and to cooperate in carrying 
out the arbitration. If the employee has failed to invoke arbitration 
within the time limits in the contract, and brings a law suit, this rule 
leaves the employer with the option of insisting on arbitration or def end-
ing the legal action. Second, the employer must agree that the time 
spent in the arbitration will not be included in calculating time limits 
which may be involved in subsequent litigation. Under these condi-
tions, the court may either stay or dismiss without prejudice a premature 
suit by an employee. 
b. When a cause of action arises under discrimination laws- Most 
discrimination laws require that employees file complaints within a 
specified period from the alleged discriminatory act. 82 In discharge <;ases 
under an arbitration clause, there are at least three dates which may 
begin the time period: the date when the employer informs the employee 
that a decision to terminate has been made; the date of termination; 
and, the date when the arbitration award upholding the termination 
is issued. 
The Supreme Court has held that knowledge of the termination deci-
sion is the relevant "occurrence" which commences the running of 
the limitations periods. 83 If the employee resorts to existing arbitration 
or grievance mechanisms, the period will not be tolled. 84 Under this 
rule, an employee must file his discrimination complaint within 180 
days of the notice that he has been terminated, regardless of how long 
the arbitration process continues. Thus, the employee is forced to file 
a "protective complaint" within the statutory period. 
The Supreme Court has not, however, foreclosed the possibility that 
an employer may explicitly agree that the limitations period will com-
mence at some later date. 85 Under such an agreement the parties may 
provide that the time would commence at receipt of the arbitrator award. 
Neither party would wish to have a judicial or administrative proceeding 
conducted simultaneously with the arbitration. Moreover, if the 
employer wishes to make the termination decision tentative until after 
arbitration, the arbitration agreement may expressly waive the 
employer's right to object to a delayed filing. 86 
Even if the employee must file a protective complaint, however, it 
does not follow that the administrative processing of the complaint 
82. Title VII, for example, requires that an employee file a claim within 180 days of the 
alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976) (extending period to 300 days where 
employee is required to resort to state procedures). 
83. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980). 
84. Id. at 261; see also I.U.E. v. Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. 229 (1976). 
85. 1.U.E. v. Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. 229 (1976). 
86. Zipes v. trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982) (holding that time periods are sub-
ject to waiver, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel). 
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must take place. The parties may agree that administrative proceedings 
which had been instituted pursuant to statute shall be stayed pending 
the decision of the arbitrator. Such an agreement may well be honored 
by overworked Civil Rights agencies. 
This type of provision would protect the employer from the costs 
and inconvenience involved in litigation beyond filing a motion to stay 
administrative or judicial proceedings, 87 and avoid subjecting the 
employer to formal discovery during the pendency of the arbitration 
decision. 88 If the outcome of the arbitration is favorable to the employee, 
there will probably be no litigation because the employer will provide 
appropriate relief. 89 If the outcome is favorable to the employer, the 
employee may choose to drop the matter rather than pursue the 
litigation. 90 If the employee does pursue the matter, the cloud of an 
adverse arbitration decision will follow him or her to the lawyer's of-
fice and to the judge's chamber. 
c. The policy question- Although the employee involved in an in-
dividual arbitration may be in an inferior bargaining position vis-a-vis 
the employer, his or her position is not as weak as that of the blue-
collar worker with limited education. When dealing with well-educated 
workers, it is appropriate to hold them more closely to their bargains, 
at least in a procedural sense. 
Therefore, if the arbitration process is fair on its face, whether or 
not the decision of the arbitrator is "final," it makes sense to treat 
arbitration as a condition precedent to litigation in terms of 1) judicial 
economy, 2) holding the parties to their bargain, and 3) encouraging 
the voluntary resolution of employment disputes. This approach is con-
sistent with the principle of preserving the employee's ultimate litiga-
tion rights under protective statutes. 91 
Even though the courts have held that arbitration does not bar a 
subsequent litigation of the discrimination issue under Title VII, the 
parties rarely take "two bites at the apple." There are relatively few 
instances known to the American Arbitration Association of situations 
where employers have lost a discrimination claim in arbitration and 
gone on to litigate under Title VII. Thus, an award against an employee 
87. See U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976) (authorizing stay of judicial proceeding 
if issue is referable to arbitration). 
88. See, e.g., Levin v. Ripple Twist Mills, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Pa. 1976), appeal 
dismissed, 549 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1977). 
89. See, e.g., Strozier v. General Motors Corp., 635 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1981). 
90. See Malinowski, An Empirical Analysis of Discharge Cases and the Work History of 
Employees Reinstated by Labor Arbitrators, 36 ARB. J., Mar., 1981, at 31, 33. 
91. A private suit may not be filed under Title VII until after expiration of a 180-day con-
ciliation period. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976). Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 102 S. Ct. 3057 
(I 982) (holding that an offer of employment tolls further back-pay liability). 
I 
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has often been accepted in fact, even though not binding in law. In 
light of this experience it is probable that the "condition precedent" 
clause will terminate most cases even though the arbitration award may 
not legally foreclose a subsequent discrimination suit. 
3. Law applicable to the agreement- The United States Arbitra-
tion Act ("USAA"), 92 may be applicable to agreements discussed in 
this Article, except for contracts of employment of certain classes of 
workers in interstate commerce. 93 This exception has been narrowly 
construed, 94 thus many employees are subject to the USAA. 95 Some 
parties, however, may either choose or be forced to resort to the State 
Arbitration Act applicable to the transaction. This might be the act 
of the jurisdiction in which the employment contract was agreed to 
and carried out, if they are the same. If they are different, another 
choice of law problem arises due to the differences in arbitration acts 
in various states, their absence in some states, and variations in state 
law with respect to the significance of the arbitration agreement and 
award. Therefore, to secure a stable body of law, the drafters of the 
arbitration clause might look to the New York Arbitration Act as the 
law to be applied. 96 This is suggested in the standard form agreements 
of the American Arbitration Association. 
CONCLUSION 
Arbitration in collective bargaining agreements has proved to be a 
major social innovation which has enhanced the quality of employ-
ment for millions of workers. Collective bargaining has not, however, 
taken hold among large numbers of employees in the growing white-
collar sector. Yet, these workers have similar interests and need to be 
treated fairly. Moreover, because of the huge social investment in educa-
tion of many of these employees, society has an interest in seeing that 
they are fairly treated. The suggested arbitration clause provides such 
protection as well as an opportunity to develop standards of fairness 
in connection with these higher-level jobs. I think that energies expended 
92. 9 u.s.c. §§ 1-14 (1976). 
93. 9 U.S.C. § I (1976). 
94. See, e.g., Aberthaw Constr. Co. v. Centre County Hosp., 366 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Pa. 
1973) (holding that agreement to arbitrate must be liberally construed in favor of arbitration), 
aff'd, 503 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974); see also Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 
104, 106 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("Once a dispute is covered by the Act, federal law applies to all ques-
tions regarding validity and enforceability."), aff'd, 653 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1981). 
95. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 218 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd on other 
grounds, 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (holding high level employees not excluded); see also Erving v. 
Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 
783 (1st Cir. 1971). 
96. N.Y. CIV. Paoc. LAw §§ 7501-14 (McKinney 1980). 
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in developing such a clause are worthwhile, and that a public con-
ference should be called to discuss the process. 
We cannot now see the shape of the future structure of employee 
relations in these higher-level jobs. Perhaps a statute of the type pro-
posed by Professor Summers will emerge as the preferred solution; 
perhaps labor organizations will appear more attractive to white-collar 
employees as employers are moved by common law developments to 
adopt a more hard-line approach; we may even live with the present 
patchwork of law. What is clear, however, is that the arbitration op-
tion deserves to be explored thoroughly as the law intrudes further 
into the employment relationship. When discussing collective bargain-
ing arbitration, the late Harry Shulman wanted to leave the law out, 
but let the lawyers in. 97 That option is not open to us. We must live 
with both the law and lawyers. In this setting, voluntary arbitration 
may well be preferable to legislation. 
97. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1024 
(1955). 
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APPENDIX 
MODEL ARBITRATION CLAUSE 
1. Subject matter 
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the 
termination of the employee by the employer, including any 
claim based in whole or in part on federal, state, or local laws, 
whether statutory or- common law, shall be settled by arbitra-
tion in accordance with this agreement. 
2. Standards to be applied 
The Arbitrator shall determine whether the termination was 
lawful under federal, state, and local statutory and common 
law which is applicable to the dispute. In addition, the Arbitrator 
shall determine whether the termination was reasonable under 
the contract and under applicable company policies. 
3. Management flexibility 
The employer reserves the right to assign and reassign the 
employee to a job; to define the work to be performed, the 
manner in which it shall be performed, the equipment and sup-
port personnel which shall be provided, the supervision to be 
provided; and to evaluate employee performance under such 
standards as the employer chooses. 
No definite term of employment is offered. The employer 
reserves the right to discharge any employee after a determina-
tion that: 
i) the employee failed to meet employment performance 
standards; or, 
ii) business needs will be furthered by said termination. 
Under this clause, the Arbitrator will have jurisdiction to 
decide if the employer did make the stated determination and 
if it was reasonable in so doing. 
The existence or application of this agreement to arbitrate 
shall not alter or expand the rights of either party under this 
agreement. 
4. Written decisions 
The Arbitrator shall submit with the award a written opin-
ion which shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
273 
274 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 16:2 
5. Selection of Arbitrator 
a. Within __ days after (notification of a decision to ter-
minate) or (termination) of the employee, the employee who 
wishes to invoke this clause shall so notify the employer in 
writing. Thereupon, the employee shall have __ days in which 
to advise the employer of the name of the attorney who will 
represent the employee in the arbitration proceedings. 
b. The employer will contact said attorney to identify the 
Arbitrator, or, failing that, to institute the procedure for iden-
tification of the Arbitrator. If no attorney is named, the 
employer will directly contact the former employee. 
If the parties cannot agree on an Arbitrator, they shall select 
an Arbitrator from the lists from the American Arbitration 
Association, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 
or the appropriate state Mediation or Arbitration Service. 
6. Qualifications of the Arbitrator 
The Arbitrator shall be an attorney who is admitted to prac-
tice law in one of the states of the United States of America. 
7. Arbitration fees and costs 
The Arbitrator's fees and expenses shall be paid by the employer. 
8. Attorney fees 
A reasonable attorney fee and expenses will be paid by the 
employer to the attorney selected by the employee. This fee 
shall be based on the regular hourly rates of the attorney for 
equivalent work. The fee and expenses to be paid by the 
employer shaH not exceed __ dollars in any event. A detailed 
bill for services and expenses shall be submitted to the employer 
by the attorney for the employee upon receipt of the Arbitrator's 
award. The Arbitrator shall retain jurisdiction to resolve any 
dispute concerning attorney fees and expenses. 
9. Discovery 
Prior to the hearing, the parties shall exchange a list of 
witnesses to be called. The employer will supply to the 
employee's attorney a copy of the employee's personnel file, 
and a copy of the personnel files of no more than __ other 
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employees whose records are relevant in the proceeding. All 
such files will be maintained in a confidential manner by the 
employee and attorney, shall be used only for preparation of 
the arbitration case, and shall be returned to the employer at 
the close of the hearing. 
10. Relief 
If the Arbitrator finds that the employee was terminated in 
violation of the law or this agreement, he shall order reinstate-
ment and back pay for time lost, less sums earned elsewhere 
or paid in lieu of employment by the employer during the period 
after discharge and before arbitration. At the option of the 
employer, which may be exercised within ten days of the receipt 
of the award, the employee shall not be reinstated, but shall 
be paid back pay in lieu of reinstatement, in the amount of 
or measured by ___ _ 
Back pay, as defined in this agreement, shall include the cost 
of all fringe benefits and of the use of facilities, space, and 
equipment normally provided to the employee by the employer. 
11. Effect of arbitration on employee's legal rights 
The decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding be-
tween the parties as to all claims which were or could have 
been raised in connection with the termination, to the full ex-
tent permitted by law. In all other cases, the parties agree that 
the decision of the Arbitrator shall be a condition precedent 
to the institution or maintenance of any legal, equitable, ad-
ministrative, or other formal proceeding by the employee in 
connection with the termination, and that the-decision and opin-
ion of the Arbitrator may be presented in any other forum on 
the merits of the dispute. 
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